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Abstract
This contribution examines the legal legitimacy of ‘Article IV
Consultations’ performed by the IMF as part of its responsi-
bility for surveillance under Article IV of its Articles of Agree-
ment. The analysis focuses on tax recommendations given
by the Fund to its member countries in the context of Con-
sultations. This paper determines that these tax recommen-
dations derive from a broad interpretation of the powers
and obligations that have been agreed to in the Fund’s Arti-
cles of Agreement. Such an interpretation leads to a legiti-
macy deficit, as member countries of the Fund have not giv-
en their state consent to receive recommendations as to
which should be the tax policies it should adopt.
Keywords: legitimacy, International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Article IV Consultations, tax recommendations, global tax
governance
1 Introduction
1.1 The IMF’s ‘Article IV Consultations’
Since its incorporation, the International Monetary
Fund (‘IMF’ or the ‘Fund’) has had as its primary
objectives ‘the wish to promote international monetary
cooperation and exchange rate stability, to assist in the
establishment of a multilateral system of payments, to
assist in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions
and to provide temporary (i.e., short-term) assistance to
correct balance of payments imbalances’.1 To achieve
these primary objectives, the IMF performs its work on
three core fronts: (i) surveillance, i.e., monitoring the
economic and financial policies of its member countries
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1. See Art. 1, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
27 December 1945, 2 UNTS 39 (hereinafter ‘Articles of Agreement’).
The full text of the Articles of Agreement is available at: <https:// imf.
org/ external/ pubs/ ft/ aa/ > (last visited 27 September 2016).
to ensure sound economic growth; (ii) lending, i.e., pro-
viding loans to member countries to resolve problems
connected to their balance of payments (such as pay-
ments to international creditors, the building of interna-
tional reserves and measures to stabilise currencies) and
iii) technical assistance, i.e., providing member countries
with practical assistance in financial and economic
affairs.2
The first of these core fronts, surveillance, comprises
both multilateral and bilateral surveillance activities by
the Fund. Multilateral surveillance focuses on assessing
the multidimensional features of the global and regional
economy, monitoring economic trends and analysing the
effect of member countries’ policies on the wider econo-
my. Reports issued in the framework of multilateral sur-
veillance include the World Economic Outlook, the Global
Financial Stability Report and Fiscal Monitor.3
Bilateral surveillance, on the other hand, takes the form
of ‘Article IV Consultations’ as they are performed
under Article IV (Obligations Regarding Exchange
Arrangements) of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement.4
The IMF’s work during Consultations involves con-
ducting regular, often annual, monitoring of its 189
member countries’ individual economies.5 Consultations
are generally aimed at giving the Fund’s views on how
individual countries can ensure economic growth and
promote international monetary stability, as well as
2. G. Loibl, ‘International Economic Law’, in M.D. Evans (ed.), Internation-
al Law (2010) 722, at 725.
3. For the World Economic Outlook, see <http:// imf. org/ external/ pubs/ ft/
weo/ 2016/ 02/ > (last visited 27 September 2016). The Global Financial
Stability Report can be consulted at: <http:// imf. org/ external/ pubs/ ft/
gfsr/ index. htm> (last visited 27 September 2016). For Fiscal Monitor,
see <www. imf. org/ en/ publications/ fm> (last visited 27 September
2016).
4. For the purpose of this contribution, I will refer to Art. IV of the Articles
of Agreement of the IMF as ‘Art. IV’, and to the IMF’s Art. IV Consulta-
tions as ‘Consultations’. According to the information published by the
IMF, available at: <http:// imf. org/ external/ about. htm>, the Fund con-
ducted over 130 consultations in 2013, 132 consultations in 2014 and
124 consultations in 2015.
5. The full list of the organisation’s member countries is available at:
<https:// www. imf. org/ external/ np/ sec/ memdir/ memdate. htm> (last
visited 27 September 2016).
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advising them on risks that may threaten the interna-
tional monetary system.6
In practice, a Consultation process begins with an offi-
cial visit (known as a ‘mission’ in IMF jargon) to a
member country. During this mission, IMF staff seek to
collect economic, financial and monetary information on
the relevant country and to discuss the country’s eco-
nomic development and policies with government offi-
cials. The main conclusions of Consultations are inclu-
ded in a report compiled by the staff. This report is then
presented to the managing director (as chairman of the
Executive Board), who is responsible for encapsulating
the views of executive directors and presenting the sum-
mary to the country’s government officials.7 The Fund
conducted over 130 Consultations in 2013, 132 Consul-
tations in 2014 and 124 Consultations in 2015.8
1.2 Blurred Legitimacy
Individual recommendations given by the IMF to coun-
tries in the context of Consultations usually also include
proposals relating to tax policies that the Fund considers
should be modified in national tax systems. It is argua-
ble, however, whether countries have consented to
receive recommendations from the Fund as to their tax
systems. This matter is of particular relevance consider-
ing that, theoretically, all countries have tax autonomy
to design their tax systems.9
Although member countries of the Fund have given
their state consent to be part of the Fund (validated
through the ratification of the Fund’s Articles of Agree-
ment), the scope of powers of the organisation as well as
the obligations derived from their condition as member
countries must be interpreted in accordance with the
treaty provisions and general principles of treaty inter-
pretation.
For the purpose of the examination, a literal reading of
Article IV revealed that this provision (in Section 3)
enables the Fund to oversee the compliance of member
countries with the obligations set forth in Section 1 of
the Article, which bind member countries ‘to collabo-
rate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly
exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system
6. According to the IMF, the international monetary system comprises ‘the
system of exchange rates and international payments that enables
countries (and their citizens) to transact with each other’. More infor-
mation on the work of the IMF is available at: <http:// imf. org/ external/
about. htm> (last visited 27 September 2016).
7. According to an IMF decision: ‘It is expected that no later than sixty-
five days after the termination of discussions between the member and
the staff, the Executive Board will reach conclusions and thereby com-
plete the consultation under Article IV.’ IMF, Decision on Bilateral and
Multilateral Surveillance (N. 15203-(12/72)) (2012) in IMF, Selected
Decisions and Selected Documents of the International Monetary Fund
37 (2014), at 27, (hereinafter ‘2012 Decision’). See also L. Martinez-
Diaz, ‘Executive Boards in International Organizations: Lessons for
Strengthening IMF Governance’, IEO Background Paper, at 8 (2008).
8. See <http:// imf. org/ external/ about. htm>
9. For the purpose of this contribution, I understand tax autonomy as the
power that states have to define their tax policies, with the exclusion of
those obligations acquired in treaties with other states and/or interna-
tional organisations.
10. Art. IV Articles of Agreement.
of exchange rates’.10 Under the same section of the Arti-
cle, each member country is particularly directed to:
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial poli-
cies toward the objective of fostering orderly eco-
nomic growth with reasonable price stability, with
due regard to its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly
underlying economic and financial conditions and a
monetary system that does not tend to produce errat-
ic disruptions;11
Hence, even though it may be derived from Article IV
that the Fund has the power to monitor its member
countries’ economic and financial policies, it is ques-
tionable whether this power enables the Fund to deliver
its members with specific tax recommendations that
touch upon fundamental aspects of national tax systems.
In principle, there are no legal consequences attached to
non-compliance with the obligations set forth in Article
IV, and, consequently, countries are not legally obliged
to follow the tax recommendations given by the Fund
during a Consultation. Yet a non-cooperating country
could be affected by consequences other than those of a
legal nature, such as a downgrading of its reputation by
the international community.12
Hence, considering the role that the IMF has in global
economic governance, I have concerns about the legiti-
macy of the tax recommendations under analysis.13
According to Franck, ‘[i]n the international context,
legitimacy is achieved if – or to the extent that – those
addressed by a rule, or by a rule-making institution,
perceive the rule or institution to have come into being
and to be operating in accordance with generally accep-
ted principles of right process.’14 Further, as rightly sta-
ted by Bodansky, ‘[w]hen international institutions were
relatively weak, legitimacy was not a pressing issue.
However, the aggregated powers that have since been
conferred on these institutions to address collective
problems mean that questions arise regarding their
legitimacy.’15
11. Ibid.
12. For an analysis of public blacklisting by international organisations as a
means of bringing about compliance, see J.C. Sharman, ‘The Bark is the
Bite: International Organizations and Blacklisting’, 16 Review of Inter-
national Political Economy 573 (2009).
13. This contribution is not aimed at analysing the role of the IMF in inter-
national governance. Numerous authors explain this theory; for that
purpose see, among others: A Vetterlein and S Park (eds.), Owning
Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank
(2016); D. Swank, ‘The New Political Economy of Taxation in the
Developing World’, 23 Review of International Political Economy 185
(2016); D. Bradlow, The Changing Role of the IMF in the Governance
of the Global Economy and its Consequences, Paper prepared for the
Annual Banking Law Update, University of Johannesburg, May 3, 2006.
14. T. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, 86 Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 46, at 51 (1992). See also T.M.
Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990), for previous
work by the author on international legitimacy.
15. D. Bodansky, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law’, in R.
Wolfrum and V. Röben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (2008)
309, at 309.
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Legitimacy, in that sense, is a fundamental principle to
be pursued in the current context of globalisation and
state coordination, as it guarantees that states’ interests
are not weakened by the actions of international organi-
sations and related arrangements.16 In the case of the
IMF, legitimacy is a highly relevant objective, given the
organisation’s influence on the adoption of economic,
financial and tax policies by its member countries.
At an individual level, a legitimacy deficit could also
result in having citizens question their country’s gov-
ernment officials on the motives underlying the adop-
tion or derogation of certain tax policies, as per the rec-
ommendations flowing from a Consultation. Ultimately,
‘in a democratic society, the payment of taxes also gives
to the taxpayer the right to participate and to have a say
in the design of the tax system’, in accordance with the
principle of ‘no taxation without representation’.17
The following case may help to exemplify the delivery
of tax policy recommendations by the Fund, within a
Consultation: The Concluding Statement of the 2014
Article IV Mission for Costa Rica recommended, among
other things, that the country move from a territorial
system of income tax to a global system, as well as
extending the General Sales Tax (GST) to include
additional goods and services, and increasing the GST
tax rate by 2%.18
The IMF’s views on Costa Rica’s fiscal policies
remained consistent throughout the 2016 Consultation
report.19 As a collateral effect, Costa Rican news media
focused attention on the IMF recommendations, imply-
16. State coordination encompasses any form of dialogue between states to
discuss and, to a certain extent, negotiate public policies falling within
their scope of interest. State coordination may take various forms, rang-
ing from legally constituted organisations or institutions to arrange-
ments, such as meetings or forums, of a less formal nature (legally
speaking). Collaterally, these organisations and arrangements produce
actions that have effects on participating and, in some cases, even on
non-participating states. State coordination is currently being demanded
in all areas of governance, including environment, fisheries, trade,
finance, tax, customs, human rights and law enforcement, to name but
a few. Consequently, governance concerns that used to be regarded as
solely territorial, and decided by a sovereign power, have now become
global or regional concerns, and are hence of a multilateral nature.
17. I. Mosquera Valderrama, ‘Legitimacy and the Making of International
Tax Law: The Challenges of Multilateralism’, 3 World Tax Journal, at 5
(2015).
18. IMF, Costa Rica: Concluding Statement of the 2014 Article IV Mission,
10 November 2014, available at: <http:// imf. org/ external/ np/ ms/
2014/ 111014. htm> (last visited 27 September 2016). In this report, the
IMF states: ‘In particular, we support broadening the VAT base to
include services and basic goods, the latter accompanied by actions to
mitigate the impact on lower income households, as well as the move
to a global income tax. If implemented, the plan will greatly enhance
macro stability, thus stimulating growth…Although significant revenue
gains may be accrued by reducing tax exemptions and other special
treatments, the substantial budget consolidation required will likely
demand increases in tax rates in the future. Thus the mission recom-
mends raising the VAT rate from 13 to 15 percent gradually and
increasing marginal tax rates on higher brackets as part of the introduc-
tion of a global income tax, thereby addressing also distributional con-
cerns. The government has confirmed its willingness to raise VAT rates
in steps starting in 2016 consistent with the consolidation recommen-
ded by the mission.’
19. IMF, Costa Rica – Concluding Statement of the 2016 Article IV Mis-
sion, 7 March 2016, available at: <http:// imf. org/ external/ np/ ms/
2016/ 030716. htm> (last visited 24 September 2016).
ing both that the country is required to follow these rec-
ommendations and that an urgent need for tax reform
exists to avoid possible disaster in the Costa Rican econ-
omy.20 Government officials also sought to justify tax-
related bills on the grounds that the IMF has ‘approved
of’ and ‘urges’ the country to adopt the policies pro-
posed in those bills.21
In this case the measures recommended by the IMF
concerned intrinsic elements of the country’s tax struc-
ture. The adoption of the recommendations by Costa
Rica (which will most likely occur after the correspond-
ing bills have been approved by Congress) will possibly
have major effects, not only from an economic, but also
from a social perspective. The 2% increase in the GST
tax rate (from the current 13% to 15%) can be expected
to have an impact on households’ disposable income,
and this could, in turn, adversely affect economic
inequality ratios.22
The case of Costa Rica should not be seen as isolated, to
the extent that IMF Consultation reports consistently
include tax recommendations on issues ranging from tax
administration to member countries’ overall tax struc-
tures. Indeed, Seabrooke has extensively studied the
content of the Fund’s tax advice to countries, determin-
ing that the organisation has a catalogue of ‘IMF-friend-
ly’ tax reform policies.23 According to this author:
[I]n the [tax] policy area the Fund has a clear norm
expressed as an ‘IMF friendly’ tax policy mix.
Throughout the post-war period the Fund has
encouraged its member states to integrate themselves
into a free trading international political economy. It
consistently advocates moving tax burdens away from
international trade and import and export taxes, as
well as taxes on capital income, and towards broad
domestic sources, particularly consumption taxes.24
20. See <http:// qcostarica. com/ costa -rica -receptive -to -imfs -vat -calls/ >,
<http:// qcostarica. com/ imf -time -is -running -out -for -costa -rica/ > (last
visited 24 September 2016); <http:// player. gfrvideo. com/ gn -
elfinanciero/ videofmipidehacerlareformafiscalenel2016 -195110. html>
(last visited 27 September 2016).
21. See <http:// gobierno. cr/ fmi -dio -aval -a -politica -monetaria -de -costa -rica
-y -reitero -urgencia -de -reforma -fiscal/ #more -10377> (last visited 20
September 2016). See also <http:// informa -tico. com/ 4 -08 -2015/
propone -fmi -racionalizar -gasto -publico -costa -rica -i -parte> (last visited
20 September 2016); <http:// elfinancierocr. com/ finanzas/ FMI -Costa -
Rica -consolidacion -ambiciosa_ 0_ 626337367. html> (last visited 24 Sep-
tember 2016).
22. Regarding the effects of implementing these and other reforms, see F.
Rodríguez Garro, F. Sancho Mora & R. Fonseca Hernández, ‘Efectos de
la Reforma Tributaria en Costa Rica: Implementación del IVA’, 70 Revis-
ta Centroamericana de Administración Pública 273 (2016); M. Loría
and C. Umaña, ‘La propuesta de consolidación fiscal: algunas reflex-
iones para su discusión’, 1 Serie Programa Visión ACADEMIACA
(2014).
23. See L. Seabrooke, ‘Bitter Pills to Swallow: Legitimacy Gaps and Social
Recognition of the IMF Tax Policy Norm in East Asia’, in A Vetterlein
and S Park (eds.), Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the
IMF and the World Bank (2016), at 151. Also see A. Broome and L.
Seabrooke, ‘Seeing like the IMF: Institutional change in small open
economies’, 14:4 Review of International Political Economy 576, at
583 (2007).
24. Seabrooke, above n. 23, at 147.
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1.3 Aim and Methodology
Departing from the above, this contribution aims to
examine the legal legitimacy of tax recommendations
delivered by the IMF to individual countries within a
Consultation procedure. The question addressed is to
what extent are these tax recommendations legally legiti-
mate? In order to answer this question, the ideas of legal
legitimacy elaborated by Bodansky will be used.25
The approach I am undertaking is innovative, since no
research has been found that specifically analyses the
legitimacy of tax recommendations delivered by the
IMF in the context of Article IV Consultations.26 For
two reasons, this analysis does not seek to provide an
exhaustive or comprehensive list of all the legitimacy
matters that could be connected to the IMF, its role in
global governance or of the IMF Consultations in gen-
eral. Additionally, this contribution does not attempt to
analyse the legitimacy of the Consultation Procedures
specifically undertaken by the IMF in Costa Rica or any
other country.
The corresponding examination will be discussed in
four sections. After the introduction, comprising the
first section, the second section provides a general over-
view of the IMF. The third section presents the analysis
of the legitimacy of tax recommendations contained in
Consultation reports. The fourth and final section sum-
marises the results and conclusions of the analysis devel-
oped in the contribution.
25. D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law?’, 93 The American
Journal of International Law 596 (1999).
26. As indicated earlier in this paper, several authors (e.g., see Seabrooke,
above n. 23; E. Riesenhuber, The International Monetary Fund Under
Constraint: Legitimacy of its Crisis Management (2001); T. Bernes,
‘IMF Legitimacy and Governance Reform: Will the G20 Help or Hin-
der?’, Remarks delivered at the G20 Seoul International Symposium:
Toward the Consolidation of G20 Summits – from Crisis Committee to
Global Steering Committee, September 28-29, 2010; A. Weber, ‘Legiti-
macy of IMF Endangered’, Deutsche Bundesbank (2009); J. Best,
‘Legitimacy Dilemmas: The IMF’s Pursuit of Country Ownership’, 28
Third World Quarterly 469 (2007)) have analyzed the legitimacy of the
IMF. Other authors have also studied the legitimacy of IMF Surveil-
lance, in general terms (see M. Mussa, ‘IMF Surveillance’, 87 The Amer-
ican Economic Review 28 (1997); R. Lavigne, P. Maier & E. Santor,
‘Renewing IMF Surveillance: Transparency, Accountability, and Inde-
pendence’, 4 The Review of International Organizations 29 (2009); M.
Edwards, K. Coolidge & D. Preston, ‘Who Reveals? Transparency and
the IMF’s Article IV Consultations’, Paper presented at the MidWest
Political Science Association, 31 March 2011), as well as the output
legitimacy of specific tax measure implemented by countries, following
IMF’s recommendations (see e.g., B. Momani, ‘Assessing the Utility of,
and Measuring Learning from, Canada’s IMF Article IV Consultations’,
39 Canadian Journal of Political Science 249 (2006); M. Edwards and
S. Senger, ‘Listening to Advice: Assessing the External Impact of IMF
Article IV Consultations of the United States, 2010-2011’, 16 Interna-
tional Studies Perspectives 312 (2015)); M. Weisbrot and H. Jorgensen,
‘Macroeconomic Policy Advice and the Article IV Consultations: A Euro-
pean Union Case Study’, Center for Economic and Policy Research
(2013).
2 The IMF: General
Description
State coordination in economic areas developed particu-
larly rapidly towards and immediately after the end of
the Second World War. This included the creation of
three important international institutions during the
Bretton Woods Conference, held in Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire, United States, in 1944: the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (better known as
the World Bank) and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).27 The 44 states participating in the
conference had as an objective the creation of an inter-
national economic system that would avoid the econom-
ic and financial distortions that had led to the Great
Depression in the 1930s.28 Further, the international
regulations and institutions created during this confer-
ence continue to constitute the backbone of the current
economic system.29
The IMF currently has 189 member countries and is
governed by four main organs: the Board of Governors,
the Executive Board, the staff and the managing direc-
tor.30 Christine Lagarde, from France, has been manag-
ing director and chairman of the Executive Board since
5 July 2011. In addition, the Fund has 17 departments
carrying out its surveillance, policy, analytical and tech-
nical work.
The Board of Governors is the highest decision-making
body in the IMF, and is composed of one governor and
one alternate governor for each member country.31
Under Article XII, Section 2(b), however, ‘the Board of
Governors may delegate to the Executive Board author-
ity to exercise any powers of the Board of Governors,
except the powers conferred directly by this Agreement
on the Board of Governors.’32 Under Section 2(g) of the
same Article, ‘The Board of Governors, and the Execu-
tive Board to the extent authorized, may adopt such
rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate
to conduct the business of the Fund.’ Therefore, the
Board of Governors can be said to hold the supreme
powers (functional and regulatory) of the Fund.
The Board of Governors and the managing director of
the Fund are responsible for electing the Executive
Board, which is composed of 24 directors who meet on a
27. Loibl, above n. 2 at 723.
28. Ibid.
29. Since then, a number of additional organisations and institutions have
been established that have advanced these developments, with the
increasing coordination in international finance law, for example, result-
ing in 1960 in the establishment of the Organisation for Economic
Coordination and Development (OECD) as the successor to the Organi-
sation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and in the G20’s
decision in 2009 to create the Financial Stability Board as the successor
to the Financial Stability Forum. See P. Subacchi and S. Pickford, Inter-
national Economic Governance: Last Chance for the G20? (2015).
30. Art. XII Articles of Agreement.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
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weekly basis to discuss the Fund’s regular dealings.33
Executive Board voting is based on the number of votes
that each director has; this, in turn, depends on the quo-
tas paid by member countries to the Fund.34 The man-
aging director is the head of the organisation’s staff and
chairman of the Executive Board. The managing direc-
tor is appointed by the Executive Board for a renewable
term of 5 years and is assisted by a first deputy manag-
ing director and three deputy managing directors.35
Since the Board Reform Amendment of 26 January
2016, member countries have been able to decide on
their quota increases. This is especially relevant because
voting shares may vary according to new quota increa-
ses. Hence, as stated by the Fund, ‘Unlike the General
Assembly of the United Nations, where each country
has one vote, decision making at the IMF was designed
to reflect the relative positions of its member countries
in the global economy.’36 This voting system differs
from the general practice in the majority of international
organisations, where each member is likely to have one
vote only. As a result, unlike equal voting systems, the
IMF presents a different arrangement enabling econom-
ically powerful countries to exert control over the IMF.
The Articles of Agreement include details of the proce-
dure applying to amendments. Under this procedure, a
proposal of amendment may be presented by a member,
a Governor or the Executive Board. The proposal is
then communicated to the chairman of the Board of
Governors for approval by a majority of votes cast. Once
the proposal has been approved by the Board of Gover-
nors, the Fund has to ask each member whether it
accepts the proposed amendment. If three-fifths of the
members, representing eighty-five percent of the total
voting power, accept the proposed amendment, the
Fund will certify the fact by addressing a formal com-
munication to all members.37 Amendments enter into
force for all members 3 months after the date of the for-
mal communication, unless a shorter period is specified
in a circular letter or telegram from the Fund.
IMF staff is currently spread over three main areas,
aligned with the core work fronts of the organisation
(surveillance, lending and technical assistance). As Con-
sultations take place in the context of the IMF’s surveil-
lance work, this is the area on which this contribution
will focus.
As mentioned earlier, the IMF undertakes both multi-
lateral and bilateral surveillance. These activities influ-
ence the current panorama of taxation as they elaborate
on recommendations to be followed by countries in for-
33. Ibid.
34. For more information on the voting powers, see <http:// imf. org/
external/ np/ sec/ memdir/ eds. aspx> (last visited 30 September 2016).
35. See <http:// imf. org/ external/ about/ mgmt. htm> (last visited 30 Sep-
tember 2016).
36. Art. XII, Section 5 Articles of Agreement; <http:// imf. org/ en/ About/
Factsheets/ Sheets/ 2016/ 07/ 27/ 15/ 24/ How -the -IMF -Makes -
Decisions> (last visited 30 September 2016).
37. Art. XXVIII (a) Articles of Agreement. In many countries, the procedures
for acceptance of amendments are the same as those for treaty ratifica-
tion. Ultimately, however, these procedures depend on the internal
standards set by each member country for regulating the subject.
mulating their tax systems and policies. The IMF’s Fis-
cal Affairs Department is responsible for determining
the tax policy advice given to countries.38 In the view of
the organisation, the IMF’s technical assistance on tax
matters ensures the stability of countries by fostering
the collection of tax revenues and enhances their overall
economic and financial growth. As the Fund sees it:
Fiscal policy affects macroeconomic stability, growth,
and income distribution. Citizens expect their gov-
ernments to ensure value-for-money for public
spending, a fair and efficient tax system, and trans-
parent and accountable management of public sector
resources.
The IMF has been a leading source of fiscal policy
and management expertise worldwide. The IMF
monitors and analyzes global fiscal trends and advises
IMF member countries on fiscal issues directly.39
3 Legal Legitimacy under
Review
3.1 Introduction
This section of the contribution aims to respond to the
question, presented at the beginning of the contribution,
of whether the tax recommendations given by the Fund
in the context of Consultations are legitimate. As stated
in Section 1 of this article, legitimacy is a long-ago and
widely discussed subject among legal theorists, resulting
in numerous definitions of the term. In agreement with
Wolfrum: ‘legitimacy is being used differently, although
it mostly means to refer to the justification of authority,
this notion being understood as the equivalent of having
the power to take binding decisions or to prescribe bind-
ing rules’.40
For the purpose of this paper, the analysis will be car-
ried out applying the knowledge elaborated by Bodan-
sky in regard to legal legitimacy. In this author’s view:
To the extent that authority is exercised at the inter-
national level by institutions rather than by interna-
tional rules directly, then, in addition to general con-
sent, we also need a concept of “legal legitimacy” −
“the condition of being in accordance with law or
principle,” as the Oxford English Dictionay puts it.
Legal legitimacy is what connects an institution’s con-
tinuing authority to its original basis in state consent.
The authority of the International Court of Justice,
for example, derives from its Statute, to which UN
member states consented. And the Court’s continu-
ing authority depends on its acting in accordance
with the Statute. If it went outside or against the
38. See <http:// imf. org/ external/ np/ exr/ key/ fiscal. htm> (last visited 30
September 2016).
39. Ibid.
40. R. Wolfrum, ‘Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective:
Some Introductory Considerations’, in R. Wolfrum and V. Röben (eds.),
Legitimacy in International Law (2008) 1, at 6.
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Statute, then its actions would lack legitimacy.41
[emphasis added]
As Bodansky rightly indicates, from a legitimacy per-
spective it is not sufficient for an international organisa-
tion to have ‘general’ consent from its member coun-
tries. ‘General’ consent refers to the consent given by
countries to an ongoing system of governance, such as
the ratification of a treaty that creates an international
organisation.42 State consent, however, cannot be disre-
garded once a treaty enters into force.43 It continues to
be highly relevant during the course of the work carried
out by international organisations, provided that it is a
filter to assess the said work and eventually hold
accountable the organisation if it goes beyond the pow-
ers it has been granted. Following Bodansky, this con-
nection between state consent and an institution’s con-
tinuing authority is achieved through legal legitimacy.44
From the foregoing, the assessment of legal legitimacy
will be performed taking into consideration the two fol-
lowing elements: (i) state consent and (ii) authority.
Both of these elements are considered sine qua non con-
ditions of legal legitimacy. The validation of state con-
sent and authority should not be taken lightly, and a
mistaken understanding could even lead to the conclu-
sion that each of these elements can exist one without
the other. To avoid falling into such grey areas I have
made the following assumptions:45
The authority of an international organisation, and more
specifically its continuing authority, is legitimate if the
said authority is exercised in agreement with the consent
given by the parties that give life to the organisation.
Hence, for the purpose of the analysis, authority (first
element of the analysis) refers to the powers or rights of
an international organisation (in this case the IMF) to
act (e.g., to give orders, make decisions and enforce obe-
dience). State consent (second element of the analysis),
understood as permission or an agreement by a sover-
eign country for something to happen or to do some-
thing, enables the authority of international organisa-
tions.46 The exercise of authority, without consent, is
legally void and constitutes abuse of power or arbitrari-
ness.
41. Bodansky, above n. 25, at 605.
42. Ibid.
43. Indeed, authors such as Wolfrum explain that ‘[t]he consent of a State
will undoubtedly be sufficient as a mechanism to invoke the legitimacy
of [an] … specific and static [obligation] [that] can be implemented by
an isolated act or omission. The same is true even if the obligation is of
a continuing nature but the commitment does not change over time as
far as its substance and scope is concerned. There is, de facto, the dan-
ger, though, that the legitimizing effect of the original consent may
fade over time. This would be particularly true if, due to changing cir-
cumstances, the burden of implementing a given obligation increased
significantly’. R. Wolfrum, above n. 40, at 9.
44. Bodansky, above n. 25, at 605.
45. See Annex 2-Figure 1: Legal legitimacy Flow Diagram. I have elabora-
ted a flow diagram that summarises my views on how to determine the
legal legitimacy of acts by international organisations.
46. The Oxford English Dictionary defines consent as: ‘permission for some-
thing to happen or agreement to do something’.
I argue that an international organisation has authority if
it acts in accordance with an international treaty signed
and ratified by the relevant parties. Contrarily, it would
lack such authority if the acts of the international organ-
isation fell outside the scope of powers granted to the
organisation by the parties to an international treaty.
In regard to the above, I consider it important to pro-
vide a brief reference to the theories that have been
extensively developed in international law about the
competences of international organisations (in the next
section). These theories help determine to what extent
an act by an international organisation falls within or
outside the scope of powers that the international organ-
isation has.
3.1.1 Some Notes Regarding the Competences of
International Organisations
Two main theories have been developed about the scope
of powers of international organisations: the theory of
attributed powers and the theory of implied powers.
The theory of attributed powers is based on the princi-
ple of speciality or the principle of attribution, presen-
ted in 1926 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
on Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube.
In its opinion, the Court responds to the question of the
scope of the powers of the European Commission of the
Danube, making clear that:
As the European Commission is not a State, but an
international institution with a special purpose, it
only has the functions bestowed upon it by the Definitive
Statute with a view to the fulfillment of that purpose,
but it has power to exercise these functions to their
full extent, in so far as the Statute does not impose
restrictions upon it.47 [emphasis added]
This theory was also developed by the ICJ in 1996 in
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, stating:
The Court need hardly point out that international
organizations are subjects of international law which
do not, unlike States, possess a general competence.
International organizations are governed by the
“principle of speciality”, that is to say, they are vested
by the States which create them with powers, the
limits of which are a function of the common inter-
ests whose promotion those States entrust to them.48
In its opinions the Court establishes that the powers that
international organisations have are restricted to those
powers conferred by the states that create these organi-
sations. Further, for the ICJ the powers of an interna-
tional organisation are limited by the common interests
47. ICJ, Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, Advisory
Opinion, 8 December 1927. The Convention establishing the Definitive
Statute of the Danube was signed on 23 July 1921 pursuant to Article
349 of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles (and the corresponding articles
of the other peace treaties concluded in 1919 and 1920).
48. ICJ, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Con-
flict, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996.
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to be attained by it per the determination of the constit-
utive members.
Hence, according to the theory of attributed powers
international organisations only have the powers
bestowed upon them by member states in an interna-
tional convention. Contrarily interpreted, an interna-
tional organisation is not able to exercise powers that fall
outside the scope of the functions it has been assigned in
its legal instruments. The current text of Article 5 of the
Treaty on the European Union serves as an example of
this idea:
Article 5
1. The limits of Union competences are governed by
the principle of conferral. The use of Union competen-
ces is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality.
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act
only within the limits of the competences conferred upon
it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the
objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred
upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the
Member States.49 [emphasis added]
In spite of the sovereignty protection involved in the
theory of attributed powers, it has often been criticised
in the literature for two main reasons. First, the theory
is questioned as to its implications for the autonomy of
international organisations as subjects having an inde-
pendent will from that of their member states.50 Second,
for practical reasons, it is objected that international
organisations are ‘living creatures’, in a constant evolu-
tion, which would impede their founding members from
foreseeing all the powers that will be required by inter-
national organisations for their operation.51 Following
Klabbers, ‘in those circumstances, the organization
should not be limited by those powers granted to it
upon its creation; instead, the organization must be
allowed some flexibility. It must be allowed certain pow-
ers which, while not expressly granted, are granted by
implication.’52 This claim lays down the foundations of
the theory of implied powers.
This second theory generally supports the idea that in
addition to those powers expressly conferred on interna-
tional organisations in their legal instruments, there are
certain powers that may be implied from the functions
and purposes that they have been assigned. The theory
of implied powers has also been developed by the ICJ in
its jurisprudence, stating that ‘the necessities of interna-
tional life may point to the need for organizations, in
order to achieve their objectives, to possess subsidiary
powers which are not expressly provided for in the basic
instruments which govern their activities.’53 Conse-
49. Art. 5 of the Treaty on the European Union.
50. J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2002),
at 66.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. ICJ, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Con-
flict, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996.
quently, where an international organisation requires a
specific capacity to fulfil and perform its objectives, that
particular capacity is deemed as granted by its constitu-
tive members although not expressly indicated in the
organisation’s constitutive documents. The doctrine of
implied powers was applied by the Permanent Court of
International Justice to the International Labour Organ-
ization in 1926.54 The ICJ also took recourse to this doc-
trine in 1949 when referring to the powers of the United
Nations.55
In my view, regardless of the election of either theory, it
can be generally concluded that international organisa-
tions have a limited competence to act (unlike states,
which have been fully vested with rights, powers and
obligations). It can also be settled that international obli-
gations may act only in accordance with their legal pow-
ers, whether these powers are explicitly recognised in
the text of the respective constituent treaty or because
they derive from the functions and objectives of the
organisation. Ultimately, what is at stake is the principle
of consent, which continues to be an axiom of the politi-
cal system and an implication of state autonomy.56
3.2 Assessment
3.2.1 Article IV of the Articles of Agreement
Consultations are performed by the Fund as part of its
surveillance activities regulated under Article IV (Obli-
gations Regarding Exchange Arrangements) of its Arti-
cles of Agreement.57
Under Section 1 of Article IV (General obligations of
members), member countries have a general obligation
‘to collaborate with [the Fund] and other members to
assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a
stable system of exchange rates.’58 This general obliga-
tion is supported by four specific obligations (in the
same section), which may be summarised as follows.
Each member country is mandated to: (i) ‘… direct its
economic and financial policies toward the objective of
fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price
54. ICJ, Competence of the International Labour Organization to Regulate,
Incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer, Advisory Opinion No.
13 of July 23rd, 1926 (Series B, No. 13, at 18-21).
55. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1949), at 182-3; cf. Effect of
Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1954), at 57.
56. Following L. Henkin, ‘state consent is the foundation of international
law. The principle that law is binding on a [s]tate only by its consent
remains an axiom of the political system, an implication of [s]tate
autonomy.’ L. Henkin, ‘General Course on Public International Law’, IV
Recueil des Cours, at 46 (1989).
57. See Annex 1. It should be noted that Article IV was amended by the
Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF in 1978.
The surveillance functions were assigned to the Fund in the modifica-
tions introduced by this Second Amendment. Previously the Fund relied
solely on Art. IV, Section 4(a) to either call on or recommend members
to take certain action or refrain from taking action to achieve the objec-
tives set out in this provision. Prior to the Second Amendment of Art.
IV, Section 4(a), set forth a general obligation to collaborate as follows:
‘Each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund to promote
exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements with
other members, and to avoid competitive exchange alterations.’
58. Art. IV, Section 1, Articles of Agreement.
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stability’;59 (ii) ‘seek to promote stability by fostering’
economic, financial and monetary conditions;60 (iii)
‘avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international
monetary system’;61 and (iv) ‘follow exchange policies
compatible’ with the commitments undertaken in the
same section.
In order to ensure that member states fulfil their obliga-
tions under Section 1 of the Article, Section 3(a) estab-
lishes two different mandates for the Fund. First, it is
impelled to ‘oversee the international monetary system
in order to ensure its effective operation’,62 while, sec-
ond, it is obliged to oversee members’ compliance with
obligations contained in Section 1 of Article IV.63
Accordingly, Section 3(b) of Article IV sets forth the
specific obligations to be met by the Fund in seeking to
fulfil the general obligations contained in Article IV,
Section 3(a). Under this provision, the Fund is compel-
led to exercise ‘firm surveillance’ over members’
exchange rate policies, as well as adopting principles to
guide members with respect to these policies.64 Article
IV, Section 3(b), also creates obligations to be complied
with by the Fund’s member countries and that, in prin-
ciple, enable the Fund to accomplish its surveillance
functions. In this sense, members are required to (i)
provide the Fund with all necessary information to exer-
cise its surveillance and (ii) to consult with the Fund, as
required by the organisation, on their exchange rate pol-
icies.65
Although the IMF’s surveillance activities are specifi-
cally regulated under Section 3 of Article IV, Section 1
becomes relevant in view of the reference made to it in
Section 3(a).
3.2.2 State Consent
International law governs relations between inde-
pendent States. The rules of law binding upon States
therefore emanate from their own free will as
expressed in conventions or by usages generally
accepted as expressing principles of law and estab-
lished in order to regulate the relations between these
co-existing independent communities or with a view
59. Art. IV, Section 1(i), Articles of Agreement.
60. Art. IV, Section 1(ii), Articles of Agreement.
61. Art. IV, Section 1(iii), Articles of Agreement.
62. Art. IV, Section 3(a), Articles of Agreement.
63. Ibid.
64. Art. IV, Section 3(b), Articles of Agreement.
65. Art. IV, Section 3(b), Articles of Agreement. As explained by the IMF’s
legal department in a 2006 analysis of the legal framework of Art. IV:
‘While the present Article IV sets forth obligations of members, it also
sets forth obligations for the Fund. Under Article IV, Section 3(a), the
Fund is required to oversee the international monetary system to ensure
its effective operation and to oversee the compliance of each member
with its obligations under Article IV. Because of the particular impor-
tance of members’ exchange rate obligations, the Articles give the Fund
even more specific direction with respect to how members’ compliance
with these obligations is to be monitored: Article IV, Section 3(b),
requires the Fund to exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate
policies of members and to adopt specific principles for the guidance of
members with respect to those policies. To enable the Fund to perform
its surveillance obligation, Article IV, Section 3(b), also requires each
member to provide the Fund with the information necessary for this
purpose and to consult with the Fund upon request.’
to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions
upon the independence of States cannot therefore be
presumed.66
The aim of this section is to analyse the first of the con-
ditions of legal legitimacy, departing from the assump-
tions that were made in the previous section. State con-
sent, as already defined, comprehends the consent of a
country to confer authority on an international organisa-
tion. For the purpose of the assessment, the validation
of state consent is to determine whether member coun-
tries of the IMF have given their consent to receive tax
recommendations from the Fund in the context of Arti-
cle IV Consultations.
In an initial stage, state consent is given by countries by
means of the signature and ratification of the treaties
establishing an international organisation. Once the
treaty enters into force, the powers that the correspond-
ing organisation will have will depend on the text of the
corresponding treaty or the interpretation given of the
functions of the organisation, as per the theories on the
capabilities of international organisations. Regardless, a
fundamental proposition of legal legitimacy is that state
consent continues to inform the authority exercised by
international organisations throughout time.
Although repetitively stated, it is necessary to recall that
the tax recommendations delivered by the Fund during
Consultation Procedures are interpreted to derive,
according to the IMF, from Article IV of the Fund’s
Articles of Agreement. Hence, for the Fund, the power
that the organisation has to perform its surveillance pro-
cedures (including the tax issuance of the tax recom-
mendations) has legal basis in this provision.
Furthermore, opinions issued within the IMF lead to
the conclusion that in the opinion of the Fund’s Execu-
tive Board, tax policies can be the subject of bilateral
surveillance by the Fund, insofar as these are connected
to the domestic stability of a member country. On 18
July 2012 the Fund’s Executive Board adopted the Deci-
sion on Bilateral and Multilateral Surveillance, in which
it took the view that:
In its bilateral surveillance, the Fund will focus on
those policies of members that can significantly influ-
ence present or prospective balance of payments and
domestic stability. The Fund will assess whether
exchange rate policies are promoting balance of pay-
ments stability and whether domestic economic and
financial policies are promoting domestic stability
and advise the member on policy adjustments neces-
sary for these purposes. Accordingly, exchange rate
policies will always be the subject of the Fund’s bilat-
eral surveillance with respect to each member, as will
66. The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ Series A, No.
10.
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monetary, fiscal, and financial sector policies…67
[emphasis added]
It is recognized that a member’s overall mix of eco-
nomic and financial policies, including both exchange
rate and domestic policies, contributes to the mem-
bers’ balance of payments stability and domestic sta-
bility and may impact the stability of the internation-
al monetary system.68
Accordingly, the issuance of tax recommendations by
the Fund during a Consultation is considered by the
organisation as derived from the general obligations
foreseen in Article IV of the Articles of Agreement,
which bind member countries to ‘endeavor to direct
[their] economic and financial policies toward the objec-
tive of fostering orderly economic growth’ and to ‘seek
to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying eco-
nomic and financial conditions’.69
In light of the theory of attributed powers, nevertheless,
the powers of the IMF would be restricted to those
explicitly conferred in the Articles of Agreement, and
the text of Article IV does not indicate a right of the
IMF to oversee countries’ tax policies. Therefore, the
understanding of the IMF cannot be accepted under
this theory.
Taking recourse to the theory of implied powers pro-
vides a wider interpretation of the powers of the Fund.
Hence, it could be argued that i) tax policies heavily
influence countries’ economic growth and stability; and
ii) public finances comprehend taxation and, therefore,
the surveillance of tax issues falls within the authority of
the IMF.
This approach, however, raises questions about the
interpretation of the general obligations established in
Article IV. Particularly, what specific actions should
member countries take in order to comply with these
general obligations?70
67. 2012 Decision, above n. 7. This decision repeals Decision N. 13919-
(07/51), adopted by the Executive Board on 15 June 2007. Guidance
note EBS/97/125, issued on 2 July 1997 by the IMF, may be also regar-
ded as creating a precedent for the Executive Board’s opinion on their
role to assess country’s tax matters. In this guidance note, the Board
indicates that ‘…the Fund should be concerned with issues such as insti-
tutional reforms of the treasury, budget preparation and approval pro-
cedures, tax administration, accounting, and audit mechanisms, central
bank operations, and the official statistics function. Similarly, reforms of
market mechanisms would focus primarily on the exchange, trade, and
price systems, and aspects of the financial system. In the regulatory and
legal areas, Fund advice would focus on taxation, banking sector laws
and regulations…’ [emphasis added].
68. Ibid.
69. Art. IV, Section 1(i), Articles of Agreement.
70. In 2006, the IMF’s Legal Department, in consultation with the Policy
Development and Review Department, issued the report Article IV of
the Fund’s Articles of Agreement: An Overview of the Legal Framework
(hereinafter 2006 Decision) aimed at ‘assist[ing] the Executive Board in
its consideration of the steps that could be taken to provide members
with more specific guidance as to their obligations under Article IV.’ In
this document, the Legal Department recognises that any interpretation
of Article IV would be a challenging mission, given that the substance
of the Article was negotiated by a small number of member countries
with underlying political reasons, outside the Executive Board. The
document also makes clear that certain executive directors and staff
criticised the Article on the grounds of its ambiguity and vagueness.
Article XXIX of the Articles of Agreement establishes
the procedure to be followed when a question of inter-
pretation of the provisions of the agreement arises
between any member country and the Fund or between
any of its members. Article XXIX, nevertheless, does
not clearly indicate how member countries of the Fund
or its organs (in application of the treaty provisions)
should give meaning to the terms of the treaty.71 Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
must be used as ancillary provision to fill the legal vac-
uum of the Articles of Agreement in this regard.72 In
conformity with Article 31, para. 1, of the Vienna Con-
vention: ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.’ [emphasis added]73
In connection, the scopes of the obligations in Section 1
of Article IV are to be interpreted in conformity with
the general object underlying the constituency of the
Fund. The purposes of the IMF are regulated under
Article I of the Articles of Agreement.74 A reading of
this provision leads to the conclusion that the members
of the Fund have not intended for the organisation to
have powers that enable it to dictate the national tax pol-
icies to be implemented by member countries. This
conclusion may also be deducted when considering IMF
documents that clearly indicate that ‘although the text
of the preamble does not give rise to obligations, it can
be used as a tool to interpret those obligations that are
set forth in Article IV, Section 1. Similarly, it provides a
useful means of understanding the scope of the Fund’s
surveillance responsibilities under Article IV, Section
3’.75
Finally, it could be argued that the power of the IMF to
conduct surveillance of tax matters is connected to the
general functions and work of the organisation. This
approach seems to have been used in the past by the
Fund, which has recognised that: ‘In reality, all policies
contribute to a country’s internal and external balances
and may ultimately impact global stability. Ultimately,
what matters is the policy mix.’76 Particularly, in 2015
the IMF issued guidance for staff to conduct Article IV
surveillance, stating that:
Article IV consultations should cover all economic
and financial policies that affect the member’s own
stability. These always include exchange rate, mone-
tary, fiscal and financial sector policies. (…) Appro-
priate fiscal policy is vital to maintain a country’s
domestic and balance of payment stability, and often
global stability. Threats to stability can result directly
from fiscal policy missteps. Equally important, fiscal pol-
icy is often part of the policy mix to address macro-criti-
71. See Annex 1.
72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 8 ILM 1969,
at 679 (hereinafter ‘Vienna Convention’).
73. Art. 31 (1), Vienna Convention.
74. See Annex 1.
75. 2006 Decision, above n. 70.
76. 2012 Decision, above n. 7.
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cal challenges that are not necessarily directly related to
public finances (e.g., slow growth, high unemployment,
and inequality). [emphasis added]77
In spite of the above, although the IMF was one of the
international organisations created at the Bretton Woods
Conference to avoid the global economic and financial
crisis seen in previous years, the effects that national
policies have nowadays on global stability cannot be
easily contained. National tax policies continue to be
part of the state’s autonomy and, although the IMF may
wish to control the corresponding spillovers by dictating
the policies that should be implemented by its member
countries, it does not have the consent of its member
countries to do so. To that extent, the use of the theory
of implied powers would also be insufficient to argue
that the IMF has power to issue tax recommendations
during an Article IV procedure.
In conclusion, the general obligations deriving from
Section 1 of Article IV cannot be interpreted in a man-
ner that enables the Fund to determine what should be
the design of a country’s tax system or the tax policies
that the country should adopt, as these are prerogatives
of a country’s tax autonomy. A broad interpretation can-
not constitute an instrument allowing international
organisations to perform actions that are beyond the
scope of the agreements reached by their constituent
members.
It is also concluded that the Fund has accidentally or
intentionally forgotten its obligations under the Articles
of Agreement, since Article IV states that the guiding
principles adopted by the IMF, pursuant to the same
provision, ‘(…) shall respect the domestic social and
political policies of members, and in applying these
principles the Fund shall pay due regard to the circum-
stances of members’.78
3.2.3 Authority
In line with the assumptions explained in Section 3.1,
legal legitimacy may be determined taking into consid-
eration two sine qua non conditions: state consent and
authority.79 These conditions operate concomitantly:
state consent enables authority, and the absence of the
former invalidates the latter.
For the purpose of this contribution, the assessment of
authority aims to determine whether the IMF has the
power to make tax recommendations to its member
countries during Article IV Consultations. The exami-
77. IMF, Guidance Note for Surveillance under Article IV Consultation
(2015).
78. Art. IV Articles of Agreement. This respect to the domestic social and
political policies of members is also recognised by the Fund in the 2012
Decision, which further clarifies that: ‘[M]embers have legitimate policy
objectives, including domestic social and political policy objectives, that
are beyond the scope of Article IV and, accordingly, beyond the scope
of this Decision, although when adopting policies to achieve these
objectives, members need to ensure that such policies are consistent
with their obligations under Article IV…[This] decision does not, and
cannot be construed or used to, expand or broaden the scope – or
change the nature – of members’ obligations under the Articles of
Agreement, directly or indirectly….’
79. Also see Annex 2.
nation of state consent, however, yielded negative
results. I have mainly assessed that member states of the
IMF have not given their consent to receive tax recom-
mendations from the Fund, provided that the powers
contained in Article IV of the Articles of Agreement are
restricted to economic and financial matters. Under
these circumstances, the question of whether the IMF
has the authority to deliver the corresponding tax advice
must also be answered negatively. The acts by the IMF
towards the issuance of the said advice can be qualified
as resulting from an abuse of authority to that effect.
3.3 Looking Ahead
Legitimacy, as developed by Thomas Franck, is a mat-
ter of degree.80 As a result, the legitimacy deficiency
that has been identified as conflicting with legal legiti-
macy does not necessarily imply that the recommenda-
tions delivered by the Fund in the Consultations are
wholly illegitimate. Accordingly, the aim of this contri-
bution is not to seek to strike out these recommenda-
tions. On the contrary, the objective of the above discus-
sion is to highlight matters that, in the current circum-
stances, entail a weakening of the legitimacy of the tax
recommendations examined and, to a certain extent, of
the Consultations themselves.
In light of the assessment, I believe that the issue arising
from the non-existence of state consent and legal legiti-
macy could be solved with an amendment to Article IV
of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement. Such an amend-
ment would be aimed at including, within the text of
this provision, the powers and rights of the IMF to
oversee and issue recommendations on national tax poli-
cy.
Looking ahead, the following list also presents a number
of related topics that could be explored in the future:
– Can the continuing practice of the IMF, regarding
the delivery of tax recommendations, consolidate
the acts of the organisation as customary law?
– Under the current state of things, what would be
the legal validity of tax surveillance by the IMF if it
were concluded that it was performed ultra vires?81
– What procedures would be available to states to
object to the acts by the IMF concerning tax sur-
veillance? And what would be the convenience of
having an appellate body that ultimately revises the
decisions by the IMF?
4 Concluding Remarks
This contribution has aimed to assess the legitimacy of
tax recommendations made by the IMF to member
countries in the context of bilateral surveillance proce-
80. T. Franck, ‘Legitimacy: A Matter of Degree’, in T. Franck (ed.), The
Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) 41, at 47.
81. See E. Osieke, ‘The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of Interna-
tional Organizations’, 77 The American Journal of International Law
239 (1983); E. Cannizzaro and P. Palchetti, ‘Ultra Vires Acts of Interna-
tional Organizations’, in J. Klabbers & A. Wallendahl (eds.), Research
Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (2011).
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dures, known as ‘Article IV Consultations’. As explored,
although the IMF has the powers to evaluate the eco-
nomic and financial situation of a country, these powers
do not enable it to give tax recommendations to its
member countries as there is no state consent in this
regard. In conclusion, the legal legitimacy (as a means of
achieving a connection between state consent and an
institution’s continuing authority) of the tax recommen-
dations is considered precarious. This is particularly rel-
evant insofar as the tax recommendations delivered by
the Fund touch upon fundamental aspects of the design
of national tax systems and must be regarded as prerog-
atives linked to countries’ tax autonomy.
On a side and final note, I believe that the conflicting
issue that has been raised should be considered not only
from a legal legitimacy perspective, but also in regard to
the legitimacy of the outcomes produced – that is,
against the medium- and long-term economic and social
consequences that the adoption of certain recommenda-
tions could have.82 In this sense, even if it could be
argued that the tax recommendations are legitimate,
these recommendations should be based on a country-
specific analysis. Such an analysis would allow the Fund
and the corresponding country to determine the specific
consequences that the policies under review will have
for the country’s situation. This, in turn, will enable
compliance with the provision in Article IV regarding
respect for member countries’ domestic policies, which
is precisely what countries agreed to when joining the
IMF.
Annex 1: Relevant provisions of
the IMF Articles of Agreement
Article I: Purposes
The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are:
i. To promote international monetary cooperation
through a permanent institution which provides the
machinery for consultation and collaboration on
international monetary problems.
ii. To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of
international trade, and to contribute thereby to the
promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the develop-
ment of the productive resources of all members as
primary objectives of economic policy.
iii. To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly
exchange arrangements among members, and to
avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
82. This matter is an object of analysis under commonly known theories of
‘output legitimacy’. For instance, see R. Wolfrum, above n. 40, at 7. For
this author: ‘If a particular body, such as the Security Council or an
international court or tribunal, although established in accordance with
the applicable rules and taking decisions according to the established
procedure, does not achieve results which the community as the
addressee of such decisions considers to be adequate, this may, in the
long run, lead to an erosion of its legitimacy.’
iv. To assist in the establishment of a multilateral sys-
tem of payments in respect of current transactions
between members and in the elimination of foreign
exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of
world trade.
v. To give confidence to members by making the gen-
eral resources of the Fund temporarily available to
them under adequate safeguards, thus providing
them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in
their balance of payments without resorting to
measures destructive of national or international
prosperity.
vi. In accordance with the above, to shorten the dura-
tion and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the
international balances of payments of members.
The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and deci-
sions by the purposes set forth in this Article.83
Article IV: Obligations Regarding Exchange
Arrangements
• Section 1: General Obligations of Members
Recognising that the essential purpose of the interna-
tional monetary system is to provide a framework that
facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and capital
among countries, and that sustains sound economic
growth, and that a principal objective is the continuing
development of the orderly underlying conditions that
are necessary for financial and economic stability, each
member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and
other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements
and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. In
particular, each member shall:
i. endeavor to direct its economic and financial poli-
cies toward the objective of fostering orderly eco-
nomic growth with reasonable price stability, with
due regard to its circumstances;
ii. seek to promote stability by fostering orderly
underlying economic and financial conditions and a
monetary system that does not tend to produce
erratic disruptions;
iii. avoid manipulating exchange rates or the interna-
tional monetary system in order to prevent effective
balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair
competitive advantage over other members; and
iv. follow exchange policies compatible with the
undertakings under this Section.
• Section 2: General Exchange Arrangements
(a) Each member shall notify the Fund, within thirty
days after the date of the second amendment of this
Agreement, of the exchange arrangements it intends to
apply in fulfillment of its obligations under Section 1 of
this Article, and shall notify the Fund promptly of any
changes in its exchange arrangements.
(b) Under an international monetary system of the kind
prevailing on 1 January 1976, exchange arrangements
may include (i) the maintenance by a member of a value
83. Art. I Articles of Agreement.
116
ELR December 2017 | No. 2 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000090
for its currency in terms of the special drawing right or
another denominator, other than gold, selected by the
member, or (ii) cooperative arrangements by which
members maintain the value of their currencies in rela-
tion to the value of the currency or currencies of other
members, or (iii) other exchange arrangements of a
member’s choice.
(c) To accord with the development of the international
monetary system, the Fund, by an eighty-five percent
majority of the total voting power, may make provision
for general exchange arrangements without limiting the
right of members to have exchange arrangements of
their choice consistent with the purposes of the Fund
and the obligations under Section 1 of this Article.
• Section 3: Surveillance over Exchange Arrangements
(a) The Fund shall oversee the international monetary
system in order to ensure its effective operation, and
shall oversee the compliance of each member with its
obligations under Section 1 of this Article.
(b) In order to fulfill its functions under (a) above, the
Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the exchange
rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific princi-
ples for the guidance of all members with respect to
those policies. Each member shall provide the Fund
with the information necessary for such surveillance,
and, when requested by the Fund, shall consult with it
on the member’s exchange rate policies. The principles
adopted by the Fund shall be consistent with coopera-
tive arrangements by which members maintain the value
of their currencies in relation to the value of the curren-
cy or currencies of other members, as well as with other
exchange arrangements of a member’s choice consistent
with the purposes of the Fund and Section 1 of this
Article. These principles shall respect the domestic
social and political policies of members, and in applying
these principles the Fund shall pay due regard to the
circumstances of members.
• Section 4: Par Values
The Fund may determine, by an eighty-five percent
majority of the total voting power, that international
economic conditions permit the introduction of a wide-
spread system of exchange arrangements based on stable
but adjustable par values. The Fund shall make the
determination on the basis of the underlying stability of
the world economy, and for this purpose shall take into
account price movements and rates of expansion in the
economies of members. The determination shall be
made in light of the evolution of the international mone-
tary system, with particular reference to sources of liq-
uidity, and, in order to ensure the effective operation of
a system of par values, to arrangements under which
both members in surplus and members in deficit in their
balances of payments take prompt, effective, and sym-
metrical action to achieve adjustment, as well as to
arrangements for intervention and the treatment of
imbalances. Upon making such determination, the
Fund shall notify members that the provisions of
Schedule C apply.
• Section 5: Separate Currencies within a Member’s
Territories
(a) Action by a member with respect to its currency
under this Article shall be deemed to apply to the sepa-
rate currencies of all territories in respect of which the
member has accepted this Agreement under Article
XXXI, Section 2(g) unless the member declares that its
action relates either to the metropolitan currency alone,
or only to one or more specified separate currencies, or
to the metropolitan currency and one or more specified
separate currencies.
(b) Action by the Fund under this Article shall be
deemed to relate to all currencies of a member referred
to in (a) above unless the Fund declares otherwise.84
Article XXIX: Interpretation
(a) Any question of interpretation of the provisions of
this Agreement arising between any member and the
Fund or between any members of the Fund shall be
submitted to the Executive Board for its decision. If the
question particularly affects any member, it shall be
entitled to representation in accordance with Article
XII, Section 3(j).
(b) In any case where the Executive Board has given a
decision under (a) above, any member may require,
within 3 months from the date of the decision, that the
question be referred to the Board of Governors, whose
decision shall be final. Any question referred to the
Board of Governors shall be considered by a Committee
on Interpretation of the Board of Governors. Each
Committee member shall have one vote. The Board of
Governors shall establish the membership, procedures,
and voting majorities of the Committee. A decision of
the Committee shall be the decision of the Board of
Governors unless the Board of Governors, by an eighty-
five percent majority of the total voting power, decides
otherwise. Pending the result of the reference to the
Board of Governors the Fund may, so far as it deems
necessary, act on the basis of the decision of the Execu-
tive Board.
(c) Whenever a disagreement arises between the Fund
and a member which has withdrawn, or between the
Fund and any member during liquidation of the Fund,
such disagreement shall be submitted to arbitration by a
tribunal of three arbitrators, one appointed by the Fund,
another by the member or withdrawing member, and an
umpire who, unless the parties otherwise agree, shall be
appointed by the President of the International Court of
Justice or such other authority as may have been pre-
scribed by regulation adopted by the Fund. The umpire
shall have full power to settle all questions of procedure
in any case where the parties are in disagreement with
respect thereto.85
 
 
84. Art. IV Articles of Agreement.
85. Art. XXIX Articles of Agreement.
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Annex 2
Figure 1 Legal legitimacy flow diagram
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